U.S. ARMED FORCES IN VIETNAM 1954-1975

NOTE

This project has been arranged in chronological order according to the date of the cover letter.
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REEL INDEX

Reel I

1966

0001  Cai Be Ambush, Headquarters, Senior Advisor, Advisory Team 96.  
In compliance with MACV Directive Number 335-8, this report is submitted on the  
Viet Cong ambush of a motor convoy consisting of 24 vehicles carrying the 1st  
Battalion, 11th Infantry Regiment, 7th Infantry Division to Chi Lang Training Center,  
Chau Doc Province. The ambush occurred at about 0850 hours, Monday, 7 February  
1966, along Highway 4 in the eastern portion of Cai Bo District, Dinh Tuong  
Province, 7th Division Tactical Area.

0015  Headquarters, 173D Airborne Brigade (Separate), Operation 'Crimp'.  
Adjutant General's Office (Army), Washington, D.C. Combat operations after action rept.  
23 February 1966. 60pp.  
On 8 January 1966 the 173rd Abn Bde (Sep) terminated a successful Operation  
MARAUDER along the Oriental River in the Hau Nghis Province and moved directly  
into the largest U.S. operation thus far conducted in Vietnam. CRIMP, as the  
operation was named, was a massive attack by air and land to strike at the very heart  
of the Viet Cong machine in Southern RVN. The notorious HOBO WOODS Region in  
Binh Duong Province, just west of the fabled IRON TRIANGLE was believed to hold  
the Politico-Military headquarters of the Viet Cong Military Region 4. The objective  
of Operation CRIMP was to find and destroy or capture all personnel, equipment,  
and intelligence material of this headquarters.

0075  Lessons Learned, 2-66—The Battle of Annihilation and The BONG SON Campaign.  
19pp.  
This issue of Lessons Learned deals with the battle of annihilation as it pertains to  
operations in RVN and illustrates the validity of the doctrine of Find, Fix, Fight and  
Finish. The emphasis in this issue is placed on the importance of rapid reaction to  
good intelligence and the fixing of an enemy force so that he may be effectively  
destroyed. Combat experience in Vietnam has shown that good intelligence of VC  
unit locations is difficult to obtain, placing a premium on swift reaction in order to  
take advantage of this information. Additionally, experience has also shown that the  
enemy will not generally stand and fight when faced by a superior force aggressively  
employed, preferring to fade away into the bush in classic guerrilla fashion. It then
becomes obvious that to prevent this fading away, in addition to aggressively attacking his force, we must fix the enemy in place by denying him routes of escape and withdrawal. This issue of Lessons Learned contains three examples of combat actions, at both large and small unit levels, two of which are considered successful and one unsuccessful, with the criteria of success being the commander's ability to react rapidly to good intelligence and to fix the enemy by denying him routes of escape and withdrawal.

0094 Operation Abilene, Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division.

3. GENERAL: On 30063OH March 1966, MACV directed Operation ABILENE commenced under control of the 1st Infantry Division. Division OPORD 7-66, dated 24 March 1966, specified that the operation was to be conducted in LONG KHANH and PHUOC TUY Provinces. The area was bounded on the west by Highway 15, on the north by Highway 1, on the south by Highway 23, and on the east by NS grid line YS 80. The two-brigade (reinf) operation was launched to locate and destroy VC forces and base camps in the area of operations. Two reinforced brigades operated in assigned zones, being prepared to move rapidly by helicopter to successive areas of operation to destroy any VC personnel or installations discovered.

0167 Operation Cocoa Beach, Headquarters, 3D Brigade, 1st Infantry Division.
This is an operational 'after action' report of research and destroy mission in Vietnam.

Contents: Task Organization; Supporting Forces; Intelligence; Mission; Concept of Operation; Execution; Administrative Matters; Special Equipment; Psyops and Civil Affairs; Commander's Analysis.

0239 Operation Lincoln, 1st Brigade (Airborne), 1st Air Cavalry Division.
Contents: Task Organization; Supporting Forces; Intelligence; Mission; Concept of Operation; Execution; Results; Administrative Matters; Lessons Learned.

0306 Operation Jim Bowie—Search and Destroy, Headquarters 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile).
Contents: Task Organization; Supporting Forces; Intelligence; Mission; Concept of Operation; Execution; Administrative Matters; Special Equipment; Psyops and Civil Affairs; Commander's Analysis.

0358 Operation Kahala, Headquarters, 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division.
Contents: Task Organization; Supporting Forces; Intelligence; Mission; Concept of Operation; Execution; Administrative Matters; Commander's Analysis.

0376 Operation Birmingham, Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division.
On 24 April 1966, MACV directed Operation BIRMINGHAM commenced under
control of the 1st Infantry Division. Division OPORD 8-66, dated 19 April 1966, specified that the operation was to be conducted in TAY NINH Province. The area was bounded on the west and north by the CAMBODIAN Border, on the south by the SONG VAM CO River and TAY NINH City and on the east by the 40 N-S grid line. The two brigade (reinf) operation was launched to locate and destroy VC forces and base camps in the area of operations. Two reinforced brigades operated in assigned areas, and moved rapidly to successive areas by helicopter to exploit new intelligence on VC troops and supply installations. Planning was continuous and orders were issued for operations in new areas as the situation developed.


Operation DENVER was conducted in the vicinity of Song Be Sector in the northern half of Phuoc Long Province during the period 10 April to 25 April 1966. The objective of the operation was to locate and capture or destroy Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army personnel, supplies, and equipment.


Operation LEXINGTON III was initiated by Headquarters MACV. The operation called for a single battalion operating in the Rung Sat Special Zone.

The operation was conducted in five phases. Phase I included an airlift and sealift into Operation Base SHARK YS056647 in TAOR “B” and a motor march into Operation Base PORPOISE (VUNG TAU). Phase II covered company size search and destroy operation in TAOR “B” and several in TAOR “A”. Phase III was the move from Operation Base SHARK in TAOR “B” to Operation Base BARRACUDA in TAOR “A”. The move was made by helicopter airlift and sealift. Phase IV covered company size operations in TAOR “A”. In Phase V the 1/18 Inf and A 1/7 Arty moved from Rung Sat Special Zone back to Bearcat by helicopter airlift and sealift.

The operation was unique in that the 1/18 Inf employed airlift by HUID and sealift by LCM and LCU. The fire support included A 1/7 Arty in DS of 1/18 Inf, LF Tm (HUIB), Naval Gunfire, USAF and Navy Air. A USMC LNO with Naval Gun Fire Team supported the 1/18 Inf the entire operation.


Contents: Task Organization; Supporting Forces; Intelligence; Mission; Concept of Operation; Execution; Results; Administrative Matters; Commander’s Analysis.


Contents: Task Organization; Supporting Forces; Intelligence; Mission; Concept of Operation; Execution; Results; Administrative Matters; Special Equipment; Commander’s Analysis.


This issue of Lessons Learned deals with the concept of pursuit as it pertains to operations in RVN. Special emphasis is placed on aggressive reaction to VC initiated attacks on friendly forces, to the end that the VC forces are destroyed as effective military organizations and maximum kill is obtained. To date, VC Main Force and North Vietnamese Army units have avoided combat with US and Free World units unless they have been able to engage isolated elements with superior
force. Most of the operations which are scheduled have as their objectives finding and destroying VC forces. A number of these operations have not made significant contact with these forces, although other objectives have been attained. In short, the obtaining of hard, reliable and timely intelligence is one of the most difficult tasks facing all friendly forces in RVN. The VC, however, continue to attack isolated or semi-isolated friendly units and installations, to include US and Free World units as well as Regional and Popular Forces and ARVN units. By attacking a friendly force, the VC have solved a major portion of the intelligence problem—contact has been achieved. Engagement and pursuit of VC forces which reveal their presence by offensive action must therefore receive the highest priority at all levels.


The operation as originally conceived was to be conducted in three phases involving deployment, employment and redeployment of the Mobile Riverine Forces. The first phase consisted of deployment of the MRF from DONG TAM to CAN THO: after which both Army and Navy elements were employed in tactical operations. The employment phase concluded generally with the course of friendly operations conducted constituting Operation CORONADO XI. The redeployment phase concluded the operation with the MRF returning to the DONG TAM area. The initial deployment phase of Operation CORONADO XI commenced on 12 February 1968, with the movement of the Mobile Riverine Force (MRF) from Dong Tam to an anchorage point in the vicinity of CAN THO. The MRF, minus the 3-60th Infantry troop carrier, APL-26, proceeded up the Mekong River to an anchorage at the eastern entrance to the Vam Nao, arriving at approximately 2000 hours early the morning of 13 February with a favorable high tide. The MRF units completed transit down the Vam Nao, into the Bassac and proceeded down stream, arriving off CAN THO shortly after 1300 hours, having completed a transit of 109 miles from Dong Tam. The APL-26 undertow proceeded independently with escort to join the MRF at CAN THO arriving on the afternoon of the 14th February. Four significant offensive operations were initiated during CORONADO XI.


Contents: Task Organization; Intelligence; Supporting Forces; Mission; Concept of Operations; Execution; Combat Services; Logistical and Administrative Results; Lessons Learned.


This an Operational After Action Report of a Search and Destroy, Spoiling Attack, and Anti-VC Tax Collection Mission.


Task Organization; Intelligence; Mission; Concept of Operation; Execution; Operational Summary; Supporting Forces; Combat Services; Logistical and Administrative; Commander's Analysis.


Contents: Task Organization; Supporting Forces; Intelligence; Mission; Concept of Operation; Execution; Results; Administrative Matters; Special Equipment and Techniques; Commander's Analysis.
0842 Operation Seward, Headquarters 1st Brigade 101st Airborne Division.  

Operation SEWARD was characterized by counterguerrilla tactics, primarily encompassing small unit actions and frequent contact with small enemy forces. The search and destroy tactics utilized consisted of saturation patrolling, night movement, night ambushes, raids and the use of small unit stay behind forces and small unit immediate action forces. The terrain over which operations were conducted included mountainous jungles, rolling hills, dry and inundated rice paddies, sand dunes and beaches.

0906 Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry. (The Wolfhounds) (Operation Attleboro).  

Contents: Task Organization; Supporting Forces; Intelligence; Mission; Concept of Operation; Execution; Special Equipment and Techniques; Commander's Analysis.

0939 Lessons Learned, Operation Attleboro, Headquarters, 25th Infantry Division.  

Contents: Task Organization; Supporting Forces; Intelligence; Mission; Concept of Operation; Execution; Results; Civic Action and Psyops.; Commander's Analysis.

Reel II

1966 cont.

0001 Operation El Paso II/III, Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division.  

On 2 June 1966, II Field Force Vietnam directed Operation EL PASO II/III commenced under control of the 1st Infantry Division. The initial area of operation covered the area vicinity of the airfield and ARVN compounds around LOC NINH in BINH LONG Province. As the operation developed and 1st Infantry Division strength was built up, forces were deployed on operation throughout BINH LONG and portions of PHUOC LONG Provinces. Three other areas of operation were established as the enemy threat was countered. Areas of operation were established around MINH THANH and the area in which the raid on the rice cache was conducted.

Initially the operation consisted of one brigade sent upon direction of Commanding General, II FORCEN and at the request of Commanding General, 5th Division (ARVN) to defend the LOC NINH area against the possibility of attack by the 9th VC Division. By mid June, a two-brigade (reinf) operation was being conducted to locate and destroy VC forces and installations. Brigades operated in assigned areas and moved rapidly to successive areas to exploit intelligence on VC troop and supply installations.

0220 Operation Lanakal/Search and Destroy and Pacification. 4th Battalion, 23d Infantry, 25th Infantry Division.  

Contents: Task Organization; Supporting Forces; Intelligence; Mission; Concept of Operation; Execution; Civil Affairs and Psyops.; Results; Administrative Matters; Special Equipment and Techniques; Commander's Analysis.
0257 **Operation Mastiff, from 1st Infantry Division.**


On 21 0645H February 1966, MACV directed Operation MASTIFF commenced under control of the 1st Infantry Division. The two-brigade (reinf) operation was launched to locate and destroy VC forces and base camps in the vicinity of the MICHELIN Rubber Plantation. The plan required two brigades to operate in assigned zones to destroy VC forces which were trapped by the SAIGON River to their rear. A forward division artillery fire support base would be established in the vicinity of RUNG CAY. The operation would be conducted in four phases, incorporating movements of assault units by helicopter and tactical motor convoys to the area of operations.

0340 **Operation Attleboro, Headquarters, 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate).**


Operation ATTLEBORO initiated on 14 September 1966 by the 196th Infantry Brigade. It was a wide range operation designed to destroy VC bases, supplies and units in TAY NINH Province. The operation continued through October with the area of interest shifting west of the SAIGON River in DAU TIENG area. On 4 November 1966, the 1st Infantry Division was ordered into the area of operation (with operational control) of all US Forces. The reason for this decision was a North Vietnamese Regiment had elected to fight, massing his regiment against the US Brigade. On 6 November 1966, the Commanding General II FFORCEV assured OPCON of all US Forces in the area. He immediately made the decision to commit elements of the 25th Infantry Division, 3d Brigade 4th Infantry Division, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate). On 7 November 1966, the Brigade was alerted to deploy one battalion to the Area of Operation to conduct surveillance of likely crossing sites along the SAIGON River in zone, destroy VC forces moving to the east across the SAIGON River in zone and to maintain one battalion at BIEN HOA as II FFORCEV reserve. The CG 173d Abn Bde (Sep) elected the 2/503d Inf for deployment to the Area of Operation MINH THANH and the 1/503d Inf to act as II FFORCEV reserve in the BIEN HOA area. Within a few hours, the 2/503d Inf and A/3/319th Arty was air landed in the Area of Operation in the vicinity of MINH THANH.

1967

0361 **Operation Gatling I and II, Headquarters, 1st Brigade 101st Airborne Division.**


Contents: Task Organization; Supporting Forces; Intelligence; Mission; Concept of Operation; Execution; Results; Administrative Matters; Commander's Analysis; Inclosures.

0386 **Lessons Learned, Headquarters, Operation Atlanta, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.**


4. (C) GENERAL: On 27 September 1966, II Field Force Vietnam directed the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment to secure a base camp area in the vicinity of YS 4296 to clear and secure highways and lines of communications in portions of Bien Hoa, Long Khanh and Phouc Tuy Provinces. Execution of the mission was initiated under the code name Operation ATLANTA. The operation commenced on 20 October 1966. Initially the operation was confined to the securing of National Highway 1 from BIEN HOA to XUAN LOC and a portion of Interprovincial Route 2 to the area of the new base camp. Concurrently, security would be provided for the engineer work
parties involved in the clearing and preparation of the area for occupancy by the Regiment in the latter part of November. A few days after the operation started the 1st Squadron and engineer units were joined by the 2nd Squadron which organized and operated out of a combat base in the Ong Que rubber plantation for almost a month.

The Regiment continually demonstrated its versatility and maneuverability throughout the operation. It was not uncommon to find the squadron operating on three independent missions covering terrain from LAI KHE (Operation ATTELERO) to the northernmost limits of the 1st Australian Task Force TAOR as shown in Annex E. The Blackhorse Regiment remained constantly on the alert ready to exploit its tremendous firepower and inherent crosscountry mobility.

0447 Lessons Learned, Operation Pickett, Headquarters, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division.
Contents: Task Organization; Supporting Forces; Intelligence; Mission; Concept of Operation; Execution; Lessons Learned.

Operation GADSDEN was a Search and Destroy and blocking operation along the CAMBODIAN border to prevent exfiltration and infiltration along routes vic CAMBODIAN border, and to destroy VC/NVA forces, supplies and base camps. This operation was conducted in four phases; Phase I - Div. Arty GS FSB and elements of 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div established a base at TRAI BI. One Bn 196th Bde prepared and positioned forces for attack; Phase II - 3d Bde and 196th Bde attacked on D-Day to seize objective 1 and 2, secured LZs, established FSBs and an air assault was conducted on each objective area. On D + 1, 3d Bde and 196th Bde attacked to seize objective 3 and 4; Phase III -25th (US) Inf Div, employed two Bdes, conducted Search and Destroy operations in Zone then established blocking positions to seal infiltration and exfiltration routes vic CAMBODIAN border; and Phase IV - Units conducted operations to the Southeast to destroy VC/NVA forces and base camps.

0550 Operation John Paul Jones, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division.
Contents: Task Organization; Supporting Forces; Intelligence; Mission; Concept of Operation; Execution; Results; Special Equipment and Techniques; Lessons Learned.

0584 Lessons Learned, Operation Atlantic City, Headquarters, 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate).
On 13 September 1966, the 4/503d Inf deployed from BIEN HOA by C-123 aircraft to Dau Tiang to reinforce the 25th ARVN Division elements and provide security for the US and ARVN units in that area. During the small unit patrolling, the contacts reported in Paragraph 13 occurred. This operation, code named "Atlantic City" ended on 22 September 1966.

0617 Lessons Learned, Operation Sioux City, Headquarters, 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate).
On 26 September, the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) launched a two battalion search and destroy operation, to locate and destroy VC/NVA forces and installations, northwest of XOM CAT. This operation, code name "Sioux City", was
part of II FFORCVE's mission of conducting operations within the III CTZ (III Corps Tactical Zone).


At 1000 hours, on 10 October 1966, the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) moved into security positions, protecting Highway 15 from Bear Cat to Phu My. This was done with the 1/11th ACR in the north and the 1/503d Infantry in the south. The 1st Australian Task Force covered the rest of the highway into Vung Tau. The purpose of this operation, named "Robin", was to secure the movement of the 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry from their land point at Vung Tau, to their new base camp at Bear Cat. This was another in a long line of security missions that the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) has performed for new incoming units since it has been in Vietnam.

0675 Lessons Learned, Operation Farragut Conducted by Headquarters, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division.

Contents: Task Organization; Supporting Forces; Intelligence; Mission; Concept of Operation; Execution; Results; Administrative Matters; Special Equipment and Techniques; Lessons Learned.

0715 Lessons Learned, Operation Attleboro, 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division.

Contents: Task Organization; Supporting Forces; Intelligence; Mission; Concept of Operation; Execution; Results; Administrative Matters; Special Equipment and Techniques; Commander's Analysis.

0760 Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division, after Action Report-Operation Junction City.

Operation JUNCTION CITY was a multi-division, IFFV controlled operation. The 1st Infantry Division was augmented by the 173d Airborne Brigade; 1st Brigade, 9th Infantry Division; 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (-); and ARVN Cavalry Troop and Ranger Battalion. The operation was intended to destroy COSVN and VC/NVA forces and installations in northern and eastern War Zone C. The operation was conducted in two major phases. JUNCTION CITY I placed blocking forces near the Cambodian border in a horseshoe configuration. The 1st Infantry Division forces occupied the northern and eastern portions, as a search and destroy force drove north. Phase I included two major engagements and the first U.S. battalion-sized parachute assault since the Korean War. Two airfields and one CIDG camp were constructed during this phase. JUNCTION CITY I ended 172400 March 1967; JUNCTION CITY II commenced on 180001 March 1967.

0979 Operation Junction City, Conducted by the Headquarters, 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division.

Contents: Task Organization; Supporting Forces; Artillery Support; Air Support; Intelligence; Mission; Concept of Operation; Execution; Results; Administrative Matters; Special Equipment and Techniques; Commander's Analysis.

1035 Operation Waco Conducted by Headquarters, 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate).
The area east of and adjacent to the 173d Airborne Brigade's (Separate) tactical area of responsibility (TAOR), is characterized by gently, uniformly sloped hills, the highest of which has an elevation of 82 meters. The area was believed to contain the Viet Cong 01 Headquarters, the 01 Security Force Company and an undetermined number of unidentified company and/or battalion-size elements in the area of operation. The Brigade Commander selected the 1/503d Inf to conduct search and destroy operations in the area. The operation was code named Operation WACO. The 1/503d Inf in coordination with the 33d Ranger Battalion with supporting artillery and other supporting elements were organically employed in the area of operation (AO).

Reel III

1967 cont.

0001 Operation Winchester by the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate).

This document is a Combat After Action Report for Operation WINCHESTER. Operation WINCHESTER was conducted by the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) during the period 8 October - 4 December 1966. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

0077 Operation Sam Houston Conducted by the 4th Infantry Division.

Operation SAM HOUSTON started on 1 January 1967, but did not really get going until the division crossed the NAM SATHAY River in mid February. Then in the next five weeks, the division had nine major contacts and a small number of contacts with NVA squad or platoon sized elements. It is significant to note that in each major contact, enemy tactics were of the same pattern. He located the battalion fire bases and kept them under constant surveillance. When the rifle companies moved out on patrol, the enemy would keep track of their movements through the use of small reconnaissance parties or trail watchers. His favorite tactic involved a procedure of reporting movements back and, at a time and location of his choosing, attempting to engage a rifle company while it was moving. He would close quickly with the elements of the company before supporting fire could be effectively employed. He would simultaneously attempt to surround the entire company and fragment it into smaller platoon sized pieces using his favorite weapons, mortars and large numbers of snipers in the trees. His mortars were countered with artillery and air and his snipers by small arms, automatic weapons and particularly the M-79 grenade launcher.

0194 Operation Dallas, Conducted by Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division.

Operation DALLAS was a 1st Infantry Division controlled operation. The division was augmented by the 1-11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. The operation was conducted against VC/NVA forces and installations in an area extending east from Route 16, from the SONG BE River south to TAN UYEN and the ONG DONG Jungle and the VIHN LOI woods, to the west of Route 16. The operational area included the major VC route of movement from War Zone D into the TAN UYEN/SAIGON area. Both airmobile and armor/mechanized forces were employed. The VINH LOI
woods, which had been a major VC base area, were destroyed by mechanized forces augmented with Rome Blows.

0275 **Operation Dazzlem Conducted by the Headquarters, 1st Cavalry Division (Am).**

Contents: Task Organization; Supporting Forces; Intelligence; Mission; Concept of Operation; Execution; Results; Administrative Matters; Commander's Analysis.

0319 **Operation Blackjack 34, 41, 41C and 42.**

Contents: Size and Composition of Forces; Mission; Conduct of Operation; Results; Significant Activities; Lessons Learned; Attachments.

0353 **Operation Junction City—Headquarters, 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate).**

Due to the length of Operation JUNCTION CITY, and the fact that the operation was conducted in two distinct phases (JUNCTION CITY I and JUNCTION CITY II), this report is divided into two sections. The first phase covers the planning, staging and execution of the parachute assault, and the inclusive dates 22 February through 15 March 1967. The second phase of this report (JUNCTION CITY II), covers operations in the MINH THANH Region of WAR ZONE 'C', 20 March through 13 April, whereupon the 173d Airborne Brigade's role in the operation was terminated.

0515 **Operation Junction City II, Conducted by the Headquarters, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.**

Contents: Task Organization; Supporting Forces; Air Cavalry Support; Intelligence; Mission; Concept of Operation; Execution; Results; Administrative Matters; Lessons Learned.

0567 **Combat after Action Report—Operation Billings, Conducted by 1st Infantry Division.**

Operation BILLINGS was a 1st Infantry Division controlled operation. The operation was conducted against VC/NVA forces and installations in an area extending east from the SONG BE River to Route 1A and from PHUOC VINH north to Highway 13 lateral. The operation was the first conducted by the 1st Infantry Division in War Zone D. During the operation, elements of the 271st VC Regiment were fought and defeated on two occasions. The general area of the operation is described.

0655 **Lessons Learned, Operation Gadsden, Headquarters, 3d Brigade 4th Infantry Division.**

Contents: Task Organization; Supporting Forces; Army Aviation; Intelligence; Mission; Concept of Operation; Execution; Results; Administrative Matters; Special Equipment and Techniques; Lessons Learned.

0678 **Operation Ahina, Conducted by the 25th Infantry Division.**

Contents: Task Organization; Supporting Forces; Intelligence; Mission; Concept of Operation; Execution; Results; Special Equipment and Techniques; Commander's Analysis.
Reel IV

1968


Contents: Task Force Organization; Conduct of Patrol; Mission; Enemy Information; Results of Encounters (Enemy) Debriefing.


The 'Battle for DAK TO' was not a designated operation in itself, but occurred within the boundaries of the 4th Infantry Division's Operation MAC ARTHUR, (in AO SPAATZ). Nevertheless, the size of the two opposing forces, the length and violence of the engagement and the overall significance of the battle have made the events that occurred in the vicinity of DAK TO from 2 October to 1 December the most important that have occurred in the Central Highlands since the 1954 Geneva Convention. This special after action report is submitted to record those events as an entity.

Contents: Name of Operation; Date of Operation; Location of Operation; Control Headquarters; Task Organization; Supporting Forces; Intelligence; Mission; Execution; Results.

0477 Operation Strike Force, 2d Battalion, 502d Infantry, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division.

Concepts: Task Organization; Supporting Forces; Intelligence; Mission; Concept of the Operation; Execution; Results; Logistics; Commander's Analysis.

0489 Operation Akron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

Contents: Name of Operation; Date of Operation; Location; Command and Control Headquarters; Task Organization; Mission; Concept of Operation; Intelligence; Execution.

0522 Lessons Learned, Operation Paul Bunyan: Land Clearing Operations, 1st Infantry Division.

Contents: Name of Operation; Date of Operation; Task Organization; Intelligence; Mission; Concept of Operation; Execution; Supporting Forces; Results.

0556 Operation Pikesville, Headquarters, 5th Special Forces Group (Abn), 1st Special Forces.

Contents: Size and Composition of Operation; Mission; Conduct of Operations; Reconnaissance Team Operations; Enemy Information; Results.

0584 Operation River Raider I, Extract, Riverine Operations.

Contents: Extracts from the Combat After Action Report: Special Equipment; Recommendations; Fire Support; Movement to and Aboard Ship; Medical Problems.

0603 Operation Akron V, 1st Brigade, 9th Infantry Division.

Contents: Name of Operation; Dates of Operation; Location; Task Organization; Supporting Forces; Intelligence; Mission; Concept of Operation.

0625 Operation Santa Fe Phases I, II and III, 1st Brigade, 9th Infantry Division.

During the period 3 November 1967 to 5 January 1968, Operation SANTA FE was conducted by the 1st Brigade, 9th Infantry Division. The First Brigade conducted Operation SANTA FE, in the MAY TAO SECRET ZONE to locate and destroy the 5th VC Division, cleared trails to provide ready access to and aerial surveillance of the Brigade AO and to upgrade Highway No. 1. The 2-47 (M), Infantry, 4-39 Infantry, 3-5 Cavalry were units under 1st Brigade, 9th Infantry Division control. Also operating in close cooperation and coordination with 1st Brigade was the 18th Division (ARVN) and TF BINH TUY (ARVN).

0664 Operation Wheeler, 1st Brigade, 101st Abn Division.
Contents; Name of Operation; Date of Operation; Location; Command Headquarters; Task Organization; Supporting Forces; Intelligence; Mission; Concept of Operations; Execution; Results; Special Equipment and Techniques; Commanders Analysis; Recommendations.

0726 Lessons Learned, Operation Yellowstone, Headquarters, 25th Infantry Division.

Contents: Name of Operation; Location; Control Headquarters; Task Organization; Supporting Forces; Intelligence; Mission; Concept of Operation; Execution; Results.

0828 Lessons Learned, Operation Camden, Headquarters, 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division.

Contents: Task Organization; Supporting Forces; Intelligence; Mission; Concept of Operation; Execution; Results; Administrative Matters; Recommendations.

0837 Lessons Learned, Assault on Loc Ninh, Headquarters, 5th Special Forces Group (Abn), 1st Special Forces.

This document describes the experiences of a unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations. 29 October-4 November 1967.

0855 Lessons Learned, Operation Pershing: Battle of Tam Quan, 1st Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division.

Contents: Task Organization; Supporting Forces; Intelligence; Mission; Concept of Operation; Execution; Administration and Logistics; Results; Commander's Analysis; Lessons Learned.

0885 Operation Shenandoah II, 1st Infantry Division.

Contents: Task Organization; USAF Support; Supporting Forces; Intelligence; Mission; Concept of Operation; Execution; Chronology; Results; Administrative Matters; Special Equipment and Techniques; Commander's Analysis; Appendix.

1034 Lessons Learned, Operation Wilderness, Headquarters, 25th Infantry Division.

The mission of the 25th Infantry Division was to conduct armed aerial reconnaissance of 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, TAOR to locate VC/NVA forces, enemy logistical bases, and interdict enemy lines of communications. The division had to provide counter-mortar aero weapons team for Dau Tieng Base Camp during the hours of darkness. It was also required to conduct route reconnaissance and security between Tay Ninh and Trang Bang.
Reel V

1968 cont.

0001 Lessons Learned, Long Binh/Saigon Tet Campaign, Headquarters, 199th Infantry Brigade (Lt)(Sep).

The LONG BINH/SAIGON TET Campaign was both an offensive and defensive operation designed to preclude rocket/mortar attacks and ground assaults on the LONG BINH/SAIGON areas.

0103 Lessons Learned, Operation Saratoga, Headquarters, 25th Infantry Division.

A detailed report is made of the 25th Infantry Division participation in Operation Saratoga conducted in Tay Ninh and Bing Duong Provinces, RVN, during February and March 1968.

0236 Lessons Learned, Operation Niagara/Cedar Falls.

The wide spread terrorism in the SAIGON-CHOLON Area perpetrated the conception of Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS, one of the largest, most complex and one of the most effective operations in the VIETNAM WAR. Intelligence reports fed to MACJ2 indicated that the source of these terrorist activities, along with the location of the Viet Cong Military Region IV Headquarters was in fact located in the heretofore impenetrable IRON TRIANGLE north of SAIGON. The mission of Operation NIAGARA/CEDAR FALLS: to seal off the Triangle and annihilate the enemy within, destroying his fortifications and generally crushing the power of the MR IV Headquarters. The Operation was the first planned multi-division Operation in VIETNAM, employing the 1st Infantry Division, the 25th Infantry Division, the 196th Light Infantry Brigade, the 5th ARVN Division, elements of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, the 18th Engineer Brigade, and the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate). This marks the second time the Brigade has operated in the IRON TRIANGLE (OPORD 25-65, 8-14 October 1965). The task given to the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) was to conduct a deception or feint from a staging area near PHU LOI in the CAU DINH JUNGLE, an island of dense forest, north of a Rubber Plantation between NATIONAL HIGHWAY 13 and the THI TINH RIVER.

0540 Lessons Learned, Operation Fargo, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

Operation FARGO was undertaken to counter increased enemy activity in the newly-formed Military Region 10 (Binh Long and Phuoc Long Provinces). This was the first operation since its deployment to Vietnam in which the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment was employed as a unit. The first reconnaissance in force operation was initiated on 26 December 1967 by the 1st Squadron operating from Loc Ninh north along highway 13 to the Cambodian border. Rome Plow clearing operations along Highway 13 from An Loc to Loc Ninh also began on 26 December 1967 and continued until 12 January 1968 when the mission was completed. The regiment continued to conduct reconnaissance in force operations until the termination of Operation FARGO on 21 January 1968.

0568 Operation Cooktown Orchid, 1st Australian Task Force.
Contents: Task Organization; Supporting Forces; Engineers; Intelligence; Mission; Concept of Operations; Execution; Commander's Analysis.

0612 Lessons Learned, Tet Offensive, Headquarters, 2 Field Force Vietnam.  
This is a report on the 1968 Viet Cong-North Vietnamese Army TET Offensive in 3 Corps Tactical Zone, and the actions of 2 Field Force Vietnam and 3 Corps, RVNAF in defeating that offensive. It includes those general events leading up to TET, the detailed course of the fighting from 31 January through 18 February and a summary of the results of the battle.

0774 Lessons Learned, Operation Ban Me Thuot, Headquarters, 3d Battalion, 6th Artillery.  
After initial contacts, the enemy studiously avoided commitment of any large size forces (battalion and upwards). The NVA elements avoided contact of any type with US forces. Aside from the harassment of villages, the enemy was unable to launch any concentrated offensive drive. The NVA elements were unable to sustain or mount any large scale offensives due to reaction capabilities of the 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry and the large scale wide area coverage of the artillery. Combined US-ARVN operations denied the enemy the use of his base areas and deprived him of vital ammunition and medical resupply channels. The enemy constantly used withdrawal by delay tactics. He was forced to continually relocate his elements and could not regroup or link up in the Ban Me Thuot area.

0825 Operation Byrd, Headquarters, 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry, 1st Air Cavalry Division.  
Contents: Task Organization; Supporting Forces; Intelligence.

0915 Battle of Lang Vei, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), 1st Special Forces.  
The Lang Vei Camp Strike Force Camp had the primary mission of border surveillance and area pacification. The border surveillance is on that portion of the border that is adjacent to the border within the Taor. The area pacification is a combination of the Detachment Military Action/Psychological Operations in conjunction with District and Province level programs. In conjunction with surveillance and pacification, the camp had the requirement for a complete reconnaissance of its Taor every month.

0954 Operation Quyet Thang, Headquarters, 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division.  
Contents: Task organizations; Supporting Forces; Intelligence; Mission; Concept; Execution; Results.

0967 Lessons Learned, OP Truong Cong Dinh, 2d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division.  
Operations during this period continued to substantiate the conclusion that riverine and airmobile means represent logical complements to one another. If the latter can be made more regularly available, they will make more effective the critical process of introducing blocking forces to turn the scales of significant battles with larger enemy forces. Two other considerations were clearly illustrated during the period: The first is that maintenance considerations must always influence the Brigade's plans for prolonged operations and the capacity to implement them. In an
emergency the Mobile Riverine Force can operate virtually continuously, but a debt in increased maintenance problems and personnel fatigue must be paid later. The second consideration is that a third, battalion-sized, maneuver element should be made available to the Mobile Riverine Force. Given the enemy's predisposition to avoid decisive contact with the Force assignment to it of another infantry battalion would provide the tactical flexibility to cut routes of withdrawal and fix and defeat the enemy on a more regular basis.

0994 Lessons Learned, Operation Coronado X, Headquarters, 2d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division.
Operation CORONADO X was conducted in the Central Mekong Delta. As originally conceived, the initial phase of the operation was to conduct riverine, search and destroy, patrolling and interdictory operations before, during, and after the Tet Truce period. Exactly at the mid-point of the operation, during the Tet Truce period, the enemy launched a massive, coordinated attack on the principal cities of the Delta. From that event to the conclusion of CORONADO X, the MRF's operations were directed specifically at crushing the Viet Cong offensive and persuading a retreating enemy, making it difficult for him to recoup his losses or reorganize his forces.

1015 Lesson Learned, OP Pershing II, 2d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division.
The missions were: to conduct operations in close coordination and cooperation with the 22nd ARVN Division and to destroy enemy forces and infrastructure and provide security to GVN RD Program.

1042 Operation TOAN THANG, 1st Australian Task Force.
Operation TOAN THANG (Phase I) proved to be relatively quiet during the phases prior to 1 ATF deployment into AOs SURFERS and SURFERS II. However it proved the Task Force could be quickly deployed at short notice from one operational area to another. Overall Operation TOAN THANG proved a most successful operation in that the Task Force: (1) Interrupted one of the main enemy infiltration routes into SAIGON and inflicted heavy enemy casualties; and (2) Identified seven infiltration groups, four of which were the first to be identified. These four had been in SVN for periods ranging from two to fifteen days.

1102 Operation TOAN THANG, 2d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division.
Contents: Name of Operation; Dates of Operation; Location; Command and Control Headquarters; Reporting Officers; Task Organization; Supporting Forces; Intelligence; Mission; Concept of Operation; Execution; Results.

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1114 Hawk/Hunter, 1st Platoon, B Company, 3d Battalion (Airborne) 503d Infantry, 5-7 April 1969.
The mission described in this report, which was given to the 503d Infantry on 29 March 1969 was to patrol and ambush in the eastern portion of the company area of operations, 10 kilometers ESE of Bao Loc City, in order to locate and destroy enemy in the area.
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