


*The*  
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**Vietnam  
and  
Southeast  
Asia  
1960-1980**



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THE SPECIAL STUDIES SERIES

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# **Vietnam and Southeast Asia, 1960-1980**


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## **ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS**

<b>AID</b>	Association for International Development
<b>ARVN</b>	Army of the Republic of Vietnam
<b>ASEAN</b>	Association of South East Asian Nations
<b>COMUSMACV</b>	Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
<b>CORDS</b>	Civil Operations and Rural Development Support
<b>DAO</b>	Defense Attaché Office
<b>DRV</b>	Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam)
<b>FPJMC</b>	Four Power Joint Military Commission
<b>GVN</b>	Government of Vietnam (South Vietnam)
<b>ICC</b>	International Control Commission
<b>MAAG</b>	Military Assistance Advisory Group
<b>MACV</b>	Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
<b>NVA</b>	North Vietnamese Army
<b>PAVN</b>	People's Army of Vietnam
<b>PRC</b>	People's Republic of China
<b>RVN</b>	Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam)
<b>RVNAF</b>	Republic of Vietnam's Armed Forces

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# REEL INDEX

## Reel I

### SOUTHEAST ASIA

Frame

0001 **Southeast Asia Analysis Report.**

*Asst. Secretary of State, Washington, DC. May 1967. 63 pp.*

The SEA monthly analysis report is an experimental attempt to improve the quality of analysis on SEA problems and to increase the audience for analytical work. Topics treated include: VC/NVA—role of the Southern Vietminh cadre in S. Vietnam, VC incidents in II and IV Corps, and pacification and VC incident patterns in Go Cong Province; friendly forces—the strategy of attrition, force effectiveness and large U.S. Army ground operations in II Corps, RVNAF effectiveness; economic—SVN inflation in CY 1967 and impact of Vietnam War on balance of payments; air force operations.

0064 **Boundary Concepts and Practices in Southeast Asia.**

*Rand Corp., Santa Monica, Calif. Robert L. Solomon. Dec. 1969. 67 pp.*

Borders in Southeast Asia are largely insecure boundaries that were established by colonial administration to stabilized spheres of influence or mark internal administrative divisions. They were not designed to withstand international pressures. Sovereignty was not defined in a strict territorial sense. And local rulers used marginal territorial concessions as policy instruments. Thus no boundaries in Southeast Asia are "hard" in the Western sense. General mobility across them continues largely unimpeded. Consequently, the process of eliminating enemy sanctuaries requires an effective administrative presence, not just military action. In Vietnam, border policymakers must also consider international repercussions arising from boundary policy options. Concludes this examination of SEA border problems: the manner in which boundary surveillance is exercised and control technology applied will be critical to the stability of the region.

0131 **The Prospects for Thailand, Cambodia and Laos to Resist Peking-Hanoi Communist Domination in the 1970s.**

*Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa. John F. Roehm, Jr. Dec. 1970. 31 pp.*

The purpose of the essay is to examine the future of Thailand, Cambodia and Laos and to assess the potential of these three key Southeast Asian mainland nations to remain viable and free from Peking-Hanoi domination in the 1970s.

0162 **Correlation of Newsmagazine Attitudes and Senate Voting on Measures to Curtail U.S. Military Operations in Southeast Asia.**

*Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa. Richard K. Bowers. March 1971. 75 pp.*

The study investigates the impact of weekly newsmagazines upon the attitudes of

senators concerning the Cooper-Church amendment to the Foreign Military Sales Act of 1970 and the Hatfield-McGovern amendment to the Fiscal Year 1971 Defense Authorization Bill. The positions of three newsmagazines, *Time*, *Newsweek*, and *US News and World Report*, were determined using content analysis techniques. These newsmagazine positions were then compared with the voting records of senators.

- 0237 **Is SEATO Dead? The Future of SEATO Under the Nixon Doctrine.**  
*Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa. Edward S. Basanez. March 1971. 66 pp.*  
This study examined whether or not the Nixon doctrine portends the demise of SEATO. Information has been obtained through research of official documents, books and periodicals on the subject and the underlying mandates for U.S. presence in Southeast Asia.
- 0303 **Indochina in Retrospect: The Communist Insurgency.**  
*Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa. Robert A. Mountel. Feb. 1973. 53 pp.*  
The paper is a review of the U.S. involvement in Indochina since 1954. It is primarily focused on the U.S. misunderstanding of the Communist insurgency, illustrating how, because of this misunderstanding, our efforts failed to produce more meaningful results. Through an analysis of this experience which continued for more than two decades, four major problem areas are discussed: the U.S. failure to perceive the full dimensions of the threat in timely fashion; its failure to accept the importance of considering the whole of Indochina, not only South Vietnam, as the operational area to be addressed, or more specifically, the overall importance of Laos to the Communist plan; the failure to immediately orient our efforts on the dominant source of the insurgency, the Communist infrastructure; and our misplaced emphasis on tactical rather than political objectives of counterinsurgency operations. Additionally, several major considerations concerning the U.S. involvement in limited warfare, such as we have seen in Indochina, are discussed.
- 0356 **The Soviet Union and Southeast Asia.**  
*Rand Corp., Santa Monica, Calif. Guy J. Pauker, July 1973. 33 pp.*  
No abstract available.
- 0389 **Asian Security in the 1980s: Problems and Policies for a Time of Transition.**  
*Rand Corp., Santa Monica, Calif. Richard H. Solomon, Nov. 1979. 309 pp.*  
Updated papers and discussion summary of a Rand conference held in January 1979 to assess the major political, economic, and military trends likely to shape Asian regional security in the 1980s are presented. Twelve chapters explore the impact of the Sino-Soviet rivalry on the region and the implication of indigenous developments associated with dramatic economic growth and social transformation of East Asia. Specific issues include extension of the Sino-Soviet conflict to Indochina; the Soviet military buildup in Asia; America's military presence and role in maintaining a force balance; Japan's new defense mood and future policy directions; the coming crossover in power relationships between North and South Korea; continuing rapid economic growth and its political consequences; the regional impact of China's economic modernization program; problems of arms transfers and nuclear proliferation; and the security implications of Asia's growing technological and industrial sophistication. An overview analysis suggests ten choices for a U.S. allied security strategy for the region which will determine the pattern of Asian security relationships in the coming decade.

## CAMBODIA

- 0698 **Cambodia and Southeast Asian Regionalism.**  
*Research Analysis Corp., McLean, Va. Bernard K. Gordon, and Anne V. Cyr. Jan. 1969. 85 pp.*  
A study is presented of aspects of Cambodian foreign policy to discern factors impinging on Cambodian participation in regional cooperation efforts in Southeast Asia—particularly in the Association of Southern Asian Nations (ASEAN). Cambodia's reliance on instability in the region as an aid in retaining her national survival and neutral image, and the circumstances under which Cambodia would be likely to participate in ASEAN are examined. Such circumstances relate especially to Cambo-



dia's neighbors—Thailand and South Vietnam—and the outcome of the Vietnam war as a determining factor in Cambodia's regional role. The study concludes with an estimate of Cambodia's relationship to the region, U.S. interests in Cambodia, and the relevance of ASEAN to U.S. interests.

- 0783 **Is U.S. Participation In South Vietnam and Cambodia Legal?**  
*Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa. Victor A. De Fiori. Dec. 1970. 30 pp.*  
The problem is considered from the viewpoint of international law and United States constitutional law. Research included examination of the U.S. Constitution, treaties, judicial decisions, legal texts, books and articles which related to subject.
- 0813 **News Coverage of the Cambodian Incursion.**  
*Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa. Luke L. Callaway, Jr. March 1972. 47 pp.*  
Contents:  
The conflict posed by Cambodia; war and the American press; Vietnamization; the Cambodian incursion; the administration story; the media story (newspaper treatment, news magazine treatment, television treatment).
- 0860 **Bleak Prospects for Meeting Kampuchean Food Needs.**  
*CIA. April 1980. 15 pp.*  
In support of planning for U.N. conferences on Kampuchea, this report forecasts the magnitude of the food shortage confronting that country this year. It estimates the amount of food and seed rice the country will need, taking into consideration the likely effect of the dry season rice crop. Appendix A describes the methodology employed to derive the estimates.
- 0875 **Kampuchea: A Demographic Catastrophe.**  
*CIA, Washington, DC. May 1980. 27 pp.*  
The estimated decline in the Kampuchean population between 1970 and 1979 is unprecedented in any national population since World War II. Population estimates have been prepared for the period 1970 to 1979 using the 1962 census as a base. The December 1979 population is estimated to range between 4.7 million and 5.5 million persons, with the most likely estimate 5.2 million—down from 7.1 million in 1970. Decimated by disease, famine, and war, and bereft of its leaders and its labor force, Kampuchean society will need decades to recover, if it survives at all.

## Reel II

### LAOS

- 0001 **Revolution in Laos: The North Vietnamese and the Pathet Lao.**  
*Rand Corp., Santa Monica, Calif. P.F. Langer, and J.J. Zasloff. Sept. 1969. 243 pp.*  
An analysis is made of the role of Vietnamese Communists in the Lao Communist (Pathet Lao) insurgency. The Pathet Lao (PL) revolutionary movement owes its existence and much of its success to the guidance and support of the Vietminh movement. How the Vietnamese will use the political capital they have amassed in Laos depended on the outcome of the Vietnam war. In any case they will regard North Vietnam/Laos border regions as essential to their security.
- 0244 **An Econometric Study of Aerial Interdiction in Southern Laos, October 10, 1970 - June 30, 1971.**  
*Air Force Academy, Colo. Herman L. Gilster, Richard D. Duckworth, and Gregory G. Hildebrandt. May 1977. 96 pp.*  
The purpose of this study is to gain insight into the use of air power in the interdiction campaign in southern Laos. Basic tools of economic analysis are used to evaluate the effectiveness of air resources employed in the Steel Tiger operating area. The primary objective of the campaign—to reduce the amount of enemy supplies reaching South Vietnam and Cambodia—is used as the basic measure of strike sortie effectiveness. Southeast Asia variable cost factors are derived and used in conjunction with production functions estimated by the technique of regression analysis to derive optimal cost-effective sortie allocations. These allocations highlight the role of

the gunship team in the interdiction effort and indicate fewer strike sorties against the enemy road network could have been flown to achieve the same level of effectiveness. Given the strike resources available, however, the variable cost of tactical air sorties actually flown was within five percent of the estimated least-cost optimum.

## VIETNAM

- 0340 **Vietcong Motivation and Morals in 1964: A Preliminary Report.**  
*Rand Corp., Santa Monica, Calif. John C. Donnell, Guy J. Pauker, and Joseph J. Zasloff. March 1965. 83 pp.*  
A briefing report on Vietcong motivation and morale with 145 Vietcong POWs, defectors and suspects, carried out by a Rand team of Americans and Vietnamese between July and December, 1964.
- 0423 **Battlefield Reports. A Summary of Lessons Learned, Headquarters, U.S. Army, Vietnam. Volume 1.**  
*Adjutant General's Office (Army), Washington, DC. Sept. 1965. 24 pp.*  
The document is a compilation of experiences and lessons learned during combat engagements with the Vietcong. These lessons were derived by U.S. units operating in all areas of the Republic of Vietnam. The purpose of this initial distribution was to give all U.S. forces in Vietnam an opportunity to share with one another the benefits of their experiences in conducting day-to-day counterinsurgency operations. Tactics and doctrines set forth in field manuals and taught at service schools are sound; however, the soldier in the field doing the job is in the best position to say where improvement and changes in techniques can be made.
- 0447 **Rural Pacification in Vietnam: 1962-1965.**  
*American University, Washington, DC. William A. Nighswonger. May 1966. 406 pp.*  
The study is concerned with the efforts of the Republic of Vietnam and its allies to establish peace in the rural areas of South Vietnam. The focus of the study is the administration of counterinsurgency campaigns at the province level and below. Part 1 deals with the context of the insurgency such as the social, political, and historical factors involved and the strategy and tactics of the Communist movement in the rural areas. Part 2 briefly surveys the efforts to pacify the rural areas, beginning with the 1954 civic action programs of Ngo Dinh Diem. The strategy of the strategic hamlet program and its successors is analyzed as an introduction to more detailed discussions in Part 3. Part 4 deals briefly with the national pacification system, with special attention to the American advisory role. Part 5 includes a summary evaluation of pacification efforts in Vietnam and a proposed theory and model for an improved approach to the problem.
- 0853 **Bombing North Vietnam: An Appraisal of Economic and Political Effects.**  
*Rand Corp., Santa Monica, Calif. Oleg Hoeffding. Dec. 1966. 41 pp.*  
An assessment is made of the U.S. air offensive against North Vietnam in terms of (1) its impact on the North Vietnamese economic and political structure, and (2) its value as a coercive force in inducing the North Vietnamese government to agree to negotiations. North Vietnamese reaction to the bombings is discussed, and implications for U.S. policy are examined.
- 0894 **Four Papers on the Vietnamese Insurgency. I. A Conservative, Decentralized Approach to Pacification in South Vietnam.**  
*Hudson Institute, Inc., Harmon-on-Hudson, N.Y. Raymond D. Gastil. Aug. 1967. 46 pp.*  
The paper is based on the observation that many Vietnamese and American advisers at the district and province level believe that if they were simply provided with more resources at this level—perhaps another regional force company in every district—then they could vastly improve and perhaps solve their pacification problem.
- 0940 **Four Papers on the Vietnamese Insurgency. II. Counterinsurgency and South Vietnam: Some Alternatives.**  
*Hudson Institute, Inc., Harmon-on-Hudson, N.Y. Raymond D. Gastil. Aug. 1967. 55 pp.*

A review of alternative counterinsurgency systems and the war in Vietnam suggests that we need to separate the people from the insurgents more positively than the districts can do in isolation. This appears to require deep fronts of patrolling, both area saturation and what is called a thickened perimeter. On the basis of this set of assumptions, the forces which might be required and the degree to which present deployments might have to be altered are discussed.

0995 **Four Papers on the Vietnamese Insurgency. III. Principles for Settlement in South Vietnam.**

*Hudson Institute, Inc., Harmon-on-Hudson, N.Y. Raymond D. Gastil. Aug. 1967. 15 pp.*

The paper outlines some suggested goals in an eventual movement toward peace and settlement in South Vietnam.

## Reel III

0001 **Four Papers on the Vietnamese Insurgency. IV. Toward the Development of a More Acceptable Set of Limits for Counterinsurgency.**

*Hudson Institute, Inc., Harmon-on-Hudson, N.Y. Raymond D. Gastil. Aug. 1967. 19 pp.*

The paper attempts to inquire into the possibility of improving the morality of our position in Vietnam—maintaining stringent limits which are sometimes costly to us, but also accomplishing our objectives with less cost to everyone involved.

0020 **Insurgent Organization and Operations: A Case Study of the Vietcong in the Delta, 1964-1966.**

*Rand Corp., Santa Monica, Calif. M. Anderson, M. Arnsten, and H. Averich. Aug. 1967. 179 pp.*

The Vietcong believe that an efficient, centrally managed organization is a major tool of revolutionary war. Their organization is complex, but it has been effective. In this study the decision-making and behavior of the Vietcong's main and local force units operating in one Delta province, Dinh Tuong, are analyzed. The period is 1964-1966. Using captured documents and interviews with ralliers, defectors, and prisoners, a portrait of how units make and execute tactical decisions and of how they supply themselves is described.

0199 **Lessons Learned, Headquarters, U.S. Army, Vietnam.**

*Operational rept. for period ending July 31, 1967. Aug. 1967. 308 pp.*  
No abstract available.

0507 **Troika on Trial: Control or Compromise. Volume I.**

*Nutt (Anita Lauve), Santa Monica, Calif. Anita Lauve Nutt. Sept. 1967. 482 pp.*  
Contents:

The Troika; The Geneva conference; launching the international Troika; Troika in action; and problems and pitfalls of the International Commissions for Supervision and Control.

0995 **Vietnam: The Origins of Revolution (1885-1946).**

*Center for Research in Social Systems. John T. McAlister, Jr. Nov. 1968. 210 pp.*  
At the heart of the continuing controversy in Vietnam is a revolutionary struggle for political order and unity which remains incomplete and has consumed the vitality of the Vietnamese for more than two decades. The fundamental changes in the structure of politics which have developed in Vietnam over the past forty years are the essence of revolution. How and why this revolution occurred and the significance of the Vietnamese experience is germane to a more perceptive understanding of revolution in general. The historical analysis is carried only through the final years of World War II.

# Reel IV

- 0001 **Troika on Trial: Control or Compromise. Volume II.**  
*Nutt (Anita Lauve), Santa Monica, Calif. Anita Lauve Nutt. Sept. 1967. 212 pp.*  
Contents:  
The international conference on the settlement of the Laotian question; Laos the second time around; Double Troika, double trouble; the disarming Troika; and the Troika vigil in Indochina.
- 0213 **Troika on Trial: Control or Compromise. Volume III. Appendixes.**  
*Nutt (Anita Lauve), Santa Monica, Calif. Anita Lauve Nutt. Sept. 1967. 114 pp.*  
Contents:  
French questions and answers on partition of Vietnam (1954); agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Cambodia (1954); agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Laos (1954); agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam (1954); map of provisional assembly areas in Vietnam (1954); unilateral declarations of Cambodia, Laos, and France (1954); final declaration of the Geneva conference, July 21, 1954; statement by the government of Vietnam, July 21, 1954; unilateral declaration by the U.S. government July 21, 1954; and invitation to the supervisory powers, July 21, 1954.
- 0327 **Herbicide Operations in Southeast Asia, July 1961 - June 1967.**  
*Pacific Air Forces APO, San Francisco, Calif. Checo Div. Charles V. Collins. October 1967. 82 pp.*  
The following topics are discussed: early operational history; expanded herbicide operations; current concept of operations; and results and effects.
- 0409 **Lessons Learned, Headquarters, U.S. Army, Vietnam.**  
*Adjutant General's Office (Army), Washington, DC. Operational rept. for period ending Oct. 31, 1967. Feb. 1968. 181 pp.*  
No abstract available.
- 0590 **Lessons Learned, Headquarters, U.S. Army, Vietnam.**  
*Adjutant General's Office (Army), Washington, DC. Operational rept. for quarterly period ending Jan. 31, 1968. Feb. 1968. 81 pp.*  
No abstract available.
- 0671 **Negotiations and Vietnam: A Case Study of the 1954 Geneva Conference. Part 2. A Fully Documented Account.**  
*Rand Corp., Santa Monica, Calif. Melvin Gurtov. July 1968. 185 pp.*  
The author gives a fully documented, detailed account of the conference.
- 0856 **Lessons Learned, Headquarters, U.S. Army, Vietnam.**  
*Operational rept. for quarterly period ending July 31, 1968. Aug. 1968. 33 pp.*  
No abstract available.
- 0889 **A Review of the Herbicide Program in South Vietnam.**  
*William F. Warren. Aug. 1968. 69 pp.*  
The review includes a history and early development of the use of herbicides in modern warfare. Also included in the report is: a summary of herbicide test and evaluation programs; current operations; defoliation aircraft attrition; assessment of psychological effects of the crop destruction program; and results of herbicide operations in Vietnam.
- 0958 **Lessons Learned, Headquarters, U.S. Army, Vietnam.**  
*Adjutant General's Office (Army), Washington, DC. Operational rept. for period ending Oct. 31, 1968. Nov. 1968. 32 pp.*  
No abstract available.

# Reel V

- 0001 **The Vietcong in Saigon: Tactics and Objectives During the Tet Offensive.**  
*Rand Corp., Santa Monica, Calif. Victoria Pohle. Jan. 1969. 81 pp.*  
The study is based on 425 Rand interviews with local residents of Saigon and Gia Dinh Province, conducted from February to mid-April 1968, concerning the Vietcong's recent Tet offensive. It focuses on Vietcong political tactics during, and popular reactions to, the offensive against Saigon and presents several conclusions.
- 0082 **Observations on the Chieu Hoi Program.**  
*Rand Corp., Santa Monica, Calif. Lucien W. Pye. Jan. 1969. 36 pp.*  
Contents:  
The background; the U.S. commitment to Chieu Hoi; GVN attitudes toward Chieu Hoi; looking to the future; and the potential of a dynamic Chieu Hoi program.
- 0118 **Lessons Learned, Headquarters U.S. Army, Vietnam.**  
*Adjutant General's Office (Army), Washington, DC. Operational rept. for quarterly period ending Jan. 31, 1969. Feb. 1969. 47 pp.*  
No abstract available.
- 0165 **The North Vietnamese Regime: Institutions and Problems.**  
*Center for Research in Social Systems, American Univ., Washington, DC. Charles N. Spinks, John C. Durr, and Stephen Peters. April 1969. 101 pp.*  
The study is intended to give background material on certain problem areas in the existing social system of North Vietnam. Emphasis is placed on the historical development of the North Vietnam Workers' Party (formerly the Indochina Communist Party), its structural organization, tactics employed to seize political power in North Vietnam after the surrender of Japan in August 1945 and the resistance war it waged against France in the period 1946-54. Details are given on the formation of the various front organizations, particularly the Vietminh and its successor, the Fatherland Front; the youth and women's organizations, and the trade unions; and on the methods employed in the North Vietnamese Communist leadership to mobilize the masses and use them to achieve their political, social, and economic objectives. Included are the discussions of the roles of the puppet Democratic and Socialist parties in furthering the aims of the Communists. Additionally, background information is given dealing with problems affecting the Roman Catholics, ethnic minorities, resettlement of the population, evacuation of the urban centers, and the developmental of local industry.
- 0266 **Documents of an Elite Vietcong Delta Unit: The Demolition Platoon of the 514th Battalion—Part One: Unit Composition and Personnel.**  
*Rand Corp., Santa Monica, Calif. David W.P. Elliott, and Mai Elliott. May 1969. 116 pp.*  
The report presents a collection of translations of captured Vietcong documents pertaining to the composition and personnel of the demolition platoon of the 514th Battalion. The documents cover the period from early 1966 to mid-May 1967, a time when the battalion was under-strength and only infrequently saw action. The unit spent much time training, reorganizing, and bolstering morale. In Party membership, the unit was of the elite. Even though under-strength, it contained a Party chapter, usually found only at the company level. Seventeen personnel dossiers, compiled mostly by the men themselves, give accounts of battles, forced marches, and personal history and afford insight into Vietcong practices and psychology.
- 0382 **Documents of an Elite Vietcong Delta Unit: The Demolition Platoon of the 514th Battalion—Part Two: Party Organization.**  
*Rand Corp., Santa Monica, Calif. David W.P. Elliott, and Mai Elliott. May 1969. 182 pp.*  
The report presents a collection of translations of Vietcong documents pertaining to the structure and functioning of the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP) in a demoli-

tion unit. Control is vested in a Party committee at each territorial echelon (from region to village) and is exercised through the committee's military affairs section, which governs the units in its area. The documents, including minutes of meetings, organizational guides, moral codes, and members' self-criticisms, recount in detail the activities that take place in the system. Of special note are the meetings to resolve problems of military discipline and effectiveness.

0564 **Documents of an Elite Vietcong Delta Unit: The Demolition Platoon of the 514th Battalion—Part Three: Military Organization and Activities.**

*Rand Corp., Santa Monica, Calif. David W.P. Elliott, and Mai Elliott. May 1969. 130 pp.*

The report presents a collection of translations of Vietcong documents pertaining to the military activities of a demolition unit operating in the Mekong Delta. Most of these documents illustrate the unit's activities during extended intervals between military engagements, during which life was a succession of political indoctrination, military training, and Party activities. Other documents deal with military organization and management. They all disclose an elaborate pattern of interlocking channels of command, supervision, and reporting, from the battalion to the squad.

0694 **Documents of an Elite Vietcong Delta Unit: The Demolition Platoon of the 514th Battalion—Part Four: Political Indoctrination and Military Training.**

*Rand Corp., Santa Monica, Calif. David W.P. Elliott, and Mai Elliott. May 1969. 104 pp.*

The report presents a collection of translations of documents pertaining to political indoctrination and military training in a Vietcong unit operating in the Mekong Delta. In Vietnamese Communist practice, the training of troops includes both indoctrination and conventional military instruction. Political indoctrination aims at giving the fighter a firm Communist ideological stand, arousing his hatred of American "bandits," and convincing him that the Party is the supreme guide.

0798 **Documents of an Elite Vietcong Delta Unit: The Demolition Platoon of the 514th Battalion—Part Five: Personal Letters.**

*Rand Corp., Santa Monica, Calif. David W.P. Elliott, and Mai Elliott. May 1969. 66 pp.*  
The report presents a collection of translations of the personal correspondence of members of a Vietcong demolition unit operating in the Mekong Delta. These letters to friends and relatives reveal the hopes and fears of soldiers in wartime. Although they have a self-conscious tone, perhaps because their authors feared censorship, the contents are no doubt sincere. They impart a strong sense of group solidarity and social cohesiveness.

0864 **Coercion in Vietnam.**

*Rand Corp., Santa Monica, Calif. William E. Simons. May 1969. 114 pp.*

The document presents an examination of the public record of the first half of 1965 to determine whether U.S. air strikes against North Vietnam represented an attempt at military coercion. The validity of criticism of the failure of U.S. air power to force Hanoi to abandon support of the Vietcong insurgency depends largely on the extent to which coercion was an objective of the bombing program. Comparison of official U.S. actions and decisions with a minimal set of actions necessary to indicate coercive intent reveals that at no time during the first half of 1965 was the coercive objective pursued alone. Only briefly was it a prominent feature of U.S. policy. Even then, the U.S. did not explicitly demand a specific course of action of Hanoi or threaten increasing punishment. Bombing was redirected toward the more immediate military objective of limiting Hanoi's infiltration of men and supplies to the South. Thwarting a Hanoi military victory by committing U.S. forces to ground combat in the South was increasingly regarded as the main way to persuade Hanoi to cease supporting the Vietcong insurgency.

# Reel VI

- 0001 **The Vietcong Style of Politics.**  
*Rand Corp., Santa Monica, Calif. Nathan Leites. May 1969. 312 pp.*  
The memorandum is one of a series of studies of Vietcong motivation and morale. It deals with the kinds of VC behavior without regard for change through time. The policy significance of the findings is implicit. Part One on patterns contains the author's analysis and comments together with a limited number of quotations from the sources. Part Two on illustrations and elaborations gives further illustrative selections from the sources and follows the sequence of observations set up in Part One. The 328 sources of information analyzed by the study of Vietcong devices for persuasion and coercion are listed in detail.
- 0313 **Lessons Learned, Headquarters, U.S. Army, Vietnam.**  
*Adjutant General's Office (Army), Washington, DC. Operational rept. for quarterly period ending April 30, 1969. May 1969. 41 pp.*  
No abstract available.
- 0354 **Fighting and Negotiating in Vietnam: A Strategy.**  
*Rand Corp., Santa Monica, Calif. Vu Van Thai. Oct. 1969. 78 pp.*  
A fighting and negotiating strategy is discussed which encourages emergence of a broader, moderate GVN that can coalesce non-Communist factions and exploit divergencies in the Communist camp. Negotiation objectives should aim at permitting diversification of Communist interests in Southeast Asia, discouraging Communist expectations of complete control of SVN, while promoting peaceful coexistence between North and South. A compromise settlement means accepting some Communist participation in South Vietnamese political life, contingent upon Communist concessions to increase the likelihood of a democratic southern government and encourage northern independence from China. If, after such a settlement, the South goes Communist gradually, without major violence, unfavorable impact on the evolution of Southeast Asia should be minimal.
- 0432 **Economic Prospects of the Republic of Vietnam.**  
*Rand Corp., Santa Monica, Calif. Timothy Hallinan. Nov. 1969. 25 pp.*  
The recent publication of a quasi-official three-volume study, "The Postwar Development of the Republic of Vietnam," raises important questions as to the prospects for a viable, independent, non-Communist Republic of Vietnam, and the roles which the U.S. may have to play in its development and protection in the 1970s. The study represents the most substantial effort so far on the part of both American and Vietnamese to bring together in coherent form their thoughts concerning the economic future of Vietnam.
- 0457 **A View of the VC: Elements of Cohesion in the Enemy Camp in 1966-1967.**  
*Rand Corp., Santa Monica, Calif. Konrad Kellen. Nov. 1969. 85 pp.*  
The reported study shows how the continuing cohesion and momentum which the VC have been able to retain in the face of protracted fighting and the great material superiority of their opponent seem to be based on a variety of factors that not only have sustained them so far, but may well continue to do so for an indefinite period of time.
- 0542 **Regroupment, Withdrawals, and Transfers—Vietnam: 1954-1955. Part I.**  
*Rand Corp., Santa Monica, Calif. Anita Lauve Nutt. Dec. 1969. 162 pp.*  
A study is presented of military and political aspects of war termination in Indochina, emphasizing negotiations, terms, and implementation of the 1954 Geneva agreements on troop regroupment, transfers, and withdrawals. Also probed are noteworthy—and likely recurrent—features of DRV negotiating style, the Catholic refugee problem, and the role of the ICC. Analysis reveals parallels with the present Vietnam situation and provides useful background data for Western negotiators faced with problems of implementing a stand-down. Chief projections for the future:

unlike 1954, PAVN and VC forces won't withdraw or regroup in exchange for the promise of an agreed political settlement; and agreement on a cease-fire itself may depend on Allied willingness to buy basic enemy principles designed to facilitate eventual reunification of Vietnam under a DRV regime.

- 0704 **Marine Combined Action Capabilities. The Vietnam Experience.**  
*Human Sciences Research, Inc., McLean, Va. Bruce C. Allnutt. Dec. 1969. 172 pp.*  
A study was initiated of the Marine Corps Combined Action Program with the objectives of improving the performance of combined action units in Vietnam and of developing a capability to upgrade local indigenous security forces engaged in counterinsurgency in other areas of possible commitment. The first phase of this study involved a detailed analysis of the program as it operated in Vietnam—placing Marine squads in the villages of I Corps to work with the Vietnamese Popular Forces to provide village security, upgrade the Popular Forces, gather intelligence, and perform civic action and psyops—and investigates the objectives, techniques, potentialities, and limitations of the concept. Recommendations are made for improvement in the program and for further development of the concept, which is seen as a highly effective and efficient counterinsurgency method deserving of wider application.
- 0876 **The Enclave: Some U.S. Military Efforts in Ly Tin District, Quang Tin Province, 1966-1968.**  
*Rand Corp., Santa Monica, Calif. F.J. West, Jr. Dec. 1969. 74 pp.*  
Lacking a doctrine for area security in Vietnam, American troops deployed in the populated areas "in support of pacification" devised various methods of operation. The enclave deployments of battalions in the Ly Tin district of Quang Tin Province may be considered typical of those deployments in I Corps between 1966 and 1968. This memorandum is a narrative account of some of the salient events that took place in Ly Tin district during that time.

## Reel VII

- 0001 **Accommodation and Coalition in South Vietnam.**  
*Rand Corp., Santa Monica, Calif. Gerald C. Hickey. Jan. 1970. 65 pp.*  
A discussion is given of the major sociopolitical groups in South Vietnam and the processes of accommodation and coalition between them.
- 0066 **AID Spring Review of Land Reform. Volume IV. Land Reform in North Vietnam and South Vietnam.**  
*Agency for International Development, Washington, DC. Harold D. Koone, Lewis E. Gleeck, Christine Pelzer White, and MacDonald Salter. June 1970. 200 pp.*  
The document on North Vietnam and South Vietnam is one of a series covering most nations that have experienced or are considering land reform. The design for each country paper is the same: the situation before reform, the reform program, and the effects of the program.
- 0266 **The Effect of the War on the South Vietnamese Economy, 1957-1967.**  
*Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Calif. Edward Albert Smyth. Sept. 1970. 77 pp.*  
The paper investigates the effect of the war on the South Vietnamese economy for the period 1957-1967. For this purpose the economy is divided into five independent sectors: the war effort, the agricultural output, the industrial output, the transportation capacity, and government non-defense expenditures. Each of these sectors is expressed as a linear function of specific political and economic variables of interest and a multiple stepwise regression analysis performed to determine the effect of these specific variables on the individual economic sectors.



- 0343 **Conversations with Enemy Soldiers in Late 1968/Early 1969: A Study of Motivation and Morale.**  
*Rand Corp., Santa Monica, Calif. Konrad Kellen. Sept. 1970. 150 pp.*  
The report presents a study of the views of prisoners of war undertaken as an aid to military and civilian decisionmakers now trying to assess what concessions can reasonably be expected from the enemy in the future course of the war. Based on post-Tet interviews of 22 enemy soldiers in 1968-69, the study attempts to determine what elements of cohesion in the VC/NVA forces make it possible for the enemy to retain effective control throughout many years of warfare. Allied military pounding and psychological warfare efforts have had little effect on enemy morale, even the 1968 Tet offensive. Most VC and NVA soldiers seem to expect an ultimate win, are not discouraged by U.S. weapon superiority, and appear determined to fight on indefinitely. In short, enemy morale is high, chances of rooting out the insurgency by force look slim, and areas of compromise by negotiation appear narrow.
- 0493 **Pacification Can Work.**  
*Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa. Alfred R. Kitts. Oct. 1970. 29 pp.*  
The essay examines the successes and failures of the pacification effort as an effective counterinsurgency method. Binh Duong Province, Republic of Vietnam, was selected as the vehicle because of its unique similarity to South Vietnam. Addressing organization and the advisors' roles and concepts, the evaluation determines that pacification can succeed under conditions where the Vietnamese people feel that the government of South Vietnam, not the U.S. government, is providing the security and the means for them to live in peace.
- 0522 **Cost of the War in Vietnam.**  
*Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa. Keith E. Duke. Nov. 1970. 24 pp.*  
The direct costs of the war in Vietnam will reach \$125 billion in FY 1971 and may reach \$150 billion before the end of hostilities. However, this substantial sum is but a fraction of the total cost of the war which must include special economic aid to South Vietnam, the cost of the dead and wounded, veterans benefits, the cost of conscription, interest on the national debt to finance the war, and the cost of inflation to the civilian economy. Excluding the social costs, such as rising crime and increasing use of drugs which are in part related to the war, the total costs will probably be in excess of \$750 billion. The extremely high overall costs of fighting a limited war with limited objectives indicates that the economic factor should loom large in policy considerations and strategic planning for the future.
- 0546 **The President and the People—Strategic Psyop in Early Phases of Vietnam War.**  
*Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa. Edward A. Kelly. Jan. 1971. 27 pp.*  
The withdrawal by President Johnson from the presidential race of 1968 represented a strategic psychological victory. This is examined by assessing the nature of the psychological threat posed to the American people in the early phases of the Vietnam War (1964-1965). It is developed that the presidency was probably the only agency capable of countering the psychological threat which existed in 1964-1965. The public papers and speeches of President Johnson are examined for that period to assess his understanding of the threat and his explanation of the developing Vietnam War to the American people.
- 0573 **International Law vs. North Vietnam. Statement of Prisoners of War.**  
*Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa. G. Rippy. March 1971. 59 pp.*  
The study examines whether or not North Vietnam is bound by the Geneva conventions of 1949 in the Vietnam conflict. If North Vietnam, as a signatory to the conventions, is able to deny the conventions' applicability at the very time it is denied most, the value of the international law in the present text is questionable.
- 0632 **An Essay on Vietnamization.**  
*Rand Corp., Santa Monica, Calif. Guy J. Pauker. March 1971. 101 pp.*  
The author presents his studies on the conflicting requirements of negotiations and Vietnamization as regards American foreign policy.

0733 **Herbicides in Support of Counterinsurgency Operations: A Cost-Effectiveness Study.** *Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Calif. John Dalton Howard. March 1972. 129 pp.*  
The study develops costs, effectiveness criteria, and cost-effectiveness ratios for military herbicide systems in Vietnam and three other alternatives which can perform the missions of foliage removal and crop destruction in support of counterinsurgency operations. The systems considered are aerial delivery of herbicides by helicopters and aircraft, tactical land clearing with crawler tractors, "slash and burn" clearing with indigenous cutters, and fire-bombing with helicopters. Two sets of cost-effectiveness vectors are obtained.

0862 **The American Experience with Pacification in Vietnam. Volume I: An Overview of Pacification.** *Institute for Defense Analyses, Arlington, Va. Chester L. Cooper, Judith E. Corson, Laurence J. Legere, David E. Lockwood, and Donald M. Weller. March 1972. 83 pp.*  
The study derives doctrinal and operational lessons from the U.S. experience with pacification in South Vietnam to guide U.S. policymakers in providing technical assistance and advice in the future to a friendly government facing an internal security problem. Volume I presents a synthesis of the study's findings and the major lessons learned. Based on those lessons, the volume concludes with some specific recommendations for courses of action by U.S. policymakers.

## Reel VIII

0001 **The American Experience with Pacification in Vietnam. Volume II. Elements of Pacification.**

*Institute for Defense Analyses, International and Social Studies Div., Arlington, Va. Chester L. Cooper, Judith E. Corson, Laurence J. Legere, David E. Lockwood, and Donald M. Weller. March 1972, 329 pp.*

The study derives doctrinal and operational lessons from the U.S. experience with pacification in South Vietnam to guide U.S. policymakers in providing technical assistance and advice in the future to a friendly government facing an internal security problem. Volume I presents a synthesis of the study's findings and the major lessons learned. Based on those lessons, the volume concludes with some specific recommendations for courses of action by U.S. policymakers. Volume II examines in considerable detail the major elements of pacification: security, economic, political and social development; reporting and evaluation systems; and the U.S. and GVN organization for pacification. Some problem areas (e.g., land reform, refugees, U.S. economic aid) are also discussed. Volume III opens with an account of the Malayan and Philippine insurgencies and the lessons learned there and then traces in detail the evolution of pacification plans and programs in Vietnam from the French-Indochina war to the present.

0330 **The American Experience with Pacification in Vietnam. Volume III. History of Pacification.**

*Institute for Defense Analyses, International and Social Studies Div., Arlington, Va. Chester L. Cooper, Judith E. Corson, Laurence J. Legere, David E. Lockwood, and Donald M. Weller. March 1972. 338 pp.*

The study derives doctrinal and operational lessons from the U.S. experience with pacification in South Vietnam to guide U.S. policymakers in providing technical assistance and advice in the future to a friendly government facing an internal security problem. Volume I presents a synthesis of the study's findings and Volume III opens with an account of the Malayan and Philippine insurgencies and the lessons learned there and then traces in detail the evolution of pacification plans and programs in Vietnam from the French-Indochina war to the present.

- 0668 **Why Did the Defense of Quang Tri Province, SVN, Collapse?**  
*Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa. Donald J. Metcalf. Oct. 1972. 43 pp.*  
 The purpose of the essay is to describe the events of the North Vietnamese offensive against the 3rd ARVN Division in Quang Tri Province during the period of March 30 to May 1, 1972. The essay begins with a discussion of the intelligence information that led up to the beginning of the offensive and the conclusions that could be drawn from the analysis. It outlines the circumstances of the daily execution of action and orders that led up to the withdrawal of the 3rd ARVN Division and its attached units from Quang Tri Province. The conclusion of the essay deals with the inherent problems of the withdrawal as they pertained to command and control, leadership, and the attitude of the individual ARVN soldier.
- 0711 **Captured American—War Criminals or Prisoners of War?**  
*Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa. Christ Christ. Nov. 1972. 33 pp.*  
 The threat of Hanoi to try American prisoners as war criminals is used as a point of departure to discuss legal issues of the Vietnam War raised by the prisoner question. Differences between customary and treaty international law are focused on opposing positions of the U.S. and Hanoi on aerial bombing, aggression and prisoner of war treatment. The essay is based on literature search of applicable international law and other relevant materials. The conclusion is reached that the prisoners' future rests not with what their rights are under international law, but on who has the power to interpret the law.
- 0744 **Nation-Building Programs: The Counter to Subversive Insurgency.**  
*Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa. Robert I. Channon. Nov. 1972. 59 pp.*  
 The study proposes that nation-building programs, based upon an interdepartmental advisory effort, and focused toward single-manager type projection to the lower government levels in a client country, can offer an effective counter to subversive insurgency. The meaning and need for nation building are examined. Principles of nation building are offered for consideration. A concept for application of nation building is proposed.
- 0803 **The Generalship of Giap—the Myths and the Realities.**  
*Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa. Douglas M. Eye. March 1973. 52 pp.*  
 Vo Nguyen Giap has served for thirty years as commander of North Vietnam's armed forces, and has become something of a legend for his stunning defeat of the French at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, and for the Tet offensive of 1968 which shocked the world. The monograph attempts to sweep away some of the myths which surround the man, exposing his errors and defeats as well as his victories, by tracing events from his flight to China in 1940; through the founding of the Vietminh; his struggle and victory over the French; his role as overlord of the Vietcong in South Vietnam; and finally his war against American forces.
- 0855 **Lesson from My Lai.**  
*Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa. Jared B. Schopper. April 1973. 21 pp.*  
 The publicity accruing to the trials and investigations associated with the My Lai Incident, which occurred in the Republic of Vietnam on March 16, 1968, raises the question: what has the Army learned from My Lai? The document considers: training in the Geneva Conventions (GC) and Rules of Engagement (ROE); the impact on the army's professional integrity; and public information considerations.
- 0876 **A Study on the Republic of Vietnam's Exports.**  
*Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Calif. Tran Trong Nga. June 1974. 101 pp.*  
 The paper concentrates on the export activities of Vietnam. Its main purpose is to present the country's export performance in the past and to estimate its prospects in the future. In doing so, the study briefly covers the foreign trade policy of developing countries and compares these to the new Vietnamese export policy.

## Reel IX

- 0001 **A Systems Analysis View of the Vietnam War, 1965-1972. Volume 1. The Situation in Southeast Asia.**  
*Asst. Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC. Thomas C. Thayer. Feb. 1975. 285 pp.*  
This twelve-volume set includes every article printed in the fifty-issue series of the Southeast Asia Analysis Report. The report represented a month-by-month analysis of the Vietnam War activity including forces and manpower, VC/NVA operations, Allied ground, naval and air operations, RVNAF, casualties and losses, population security, costs and inflation, and construction. Volume 1 contains South Vietnam, the situation and trends; Cambodia, and Thailand.
- 0286 **A Systems Analysis View of the Vietnam War, 1965-1972. Volume 6. Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF).**  
*Asst. Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC. Thomas C. Thayer. Feb. 1975. 205 pp.*  
Details the effectiveness and leadership of the RVNAF.
- 0491 **A Systems Analysis View of the Vietnam War, 1965-1972. Volume 10. Pacification and Civil Affairs.**  
*Asst. Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC. Thomas C. Thayer. Feb. 1975. 195 pp.*  
Details road and railroad security, pacification forces, VC infrastructure; refugees, land reform, elections, and gauging South Vietnamese attitudes.
- 0686 **Defense Attaché Saigon: RNAVF Quarterly Assessment. 2nd Quarter FY74.**  
*Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC. Rept. for Oct. 1-Dec. 1, 1973. John E. Murray and Walter A. Williams. Feb. 1974. 356 pp.*  
Contents:  
Threat assessment; friendly situation; RVNAF intelligence capability; RVNAF force structure; Vietnamese Army; Vietnamese Air Force; Vietnamese Navy; Vietnamese Marine Corps; territorial forces; RVNAF communications electronic capability; Republic of Vietnam armed forces training; RVNAF programs, plans and morale; JGS command and control; distinguished visitors; DATT assessment.

## Reel X

- 0001 **Defense Attaché Saigon: RVNAF Quarterly Assessment, 3rd Quarter FY74.**  
*Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC. Rept. for Jan. 1 - Mar. 31, 1974. John E. Murray and Walter A. Williams. May 1974. 369 pp.*  
Contents:  
Threat assessment; friendly situation; RVNAF intelligence capability; RVNAF force structure; Vietnamese Army; Vietnamese Air Force; Vietnamese Navy; Vietnamese Marine Corps; territorial forces; RVNAF communications-electronics capability; Republic of Vietnam armed forces training; RVNAF plans and programs and morale; JGS command and control; distinguished visitors; DATT assessment.
- 0370 **Defense Attaché Saigon: RVNAF Quarterly Assessment, 4th Quarter FY 74.**  
*Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC. Rept. for Apr. 1 - Jun. 30, 1974. John E. Murray and Maximilian Lamont. Aug. 1974. 328 pp.*  
Contents:  
Threat assessment; friendly situation; RVNAF intelligence capability; RVNAF force structure; Vietnamese Army; Vietnamese Air Force; Vietnamese Navy; Vietnamese Marine Corps; territorial forces; RVNAF communications-electronics capability; Republic of Vietnam armed forces training; RVNAF plans and programs and morale; JGS command and control; distinguished visitors; DATT assessment.

- 0698 **Defense Attaché Saigon: RVNAF Quarterly Assessment, 1st Quarter FY75.**  
*Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC. Rept. for Jul. 1 - Sept. 30, 1974. H.D. Smith and Maximilian Lamont. Nov. 1974. 273 pp.*  
 Partial contents:  
 Threat assessment; friendly situation; RVNAF intelligence; RVNAF force structure; Vietnamese Army; Vietnamese Air Force; Vietnamese Navy; Vietnamese Marine Corps; territorial forces; RVNAF communications/electronics capability; RV armed forces training; RVNAF plans, programs and morale; and JGS command and control.
- 0971 **An Evaluation of the Pacification Program in South Vietnam and the Bombing of North Vietnam.**  
*Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa. Johnson H. Wong. Oct. 1974. 27 pp.*  
 The questions involved are whether the pacification program in South Vietnam will be successful and therefore be of strategic value to other countries encountering similar guerrilla activities and whether the strategic bombing of an underdeveloped country is effective. Data was gathered using a literature research. The pacification program based on the establishment of strategic hamlets per se will not be successful unless other factors are considered, i.e., the geography of the country, the political stability of the government, military security, etc. Massive bombing of North Vietnam was not effective in weakening its will and capacity to support the Vietcong since the type of warfare and lack of mechanized equipment did not render its military wholly dependent upon parts, POL and supplies.

## Reel XI

- 0001 **Defense Attaché Saigon: RVNAF Quarterly Assessment, 2nd Quarter FY75.**  
*Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC. Rept. for Oct. 1 - Dec. 31, 1974. H.D. Smith, Maximilian Lamont, and W.E. Legro. Feb. 1975. 241 pp.*  
 Contents:  
 Threat assessment; friendly situation; RVNAF intelligence capabilities; RVNAF force structure; Vietnamese Army; Vietnamese Air Force; Vietnamese Navy; Vietnamese Marine Corps; territorial forces; RVNAF communications/electronics capability; RV armed forces training; RVNAF plans, programs and morale; JGS command and control; distinguished visitors; DATT assessment.
- 0242 **Defense Attaché Saigon: RVNAF Final Assessment, January 1 thru April 25, FY75.**  
*Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC. H.D. Smith and Maximilian Lamont. June 1975. 365 pp.*  
 Contents:  
 Threat assessment; friendly situation; RVNAF intelligence capabilities; RVNAF force structure; Vietnamese Army; Vietnamese Air Force; Vietnamese Navy; Vietnamese Marine Corps; territorial forces; RVNAF communications/electronics capability; RV armed forces training; RVNAF plans, programs and morale; JGS command and control; DAO distinguished visitors; evacuation of military regions 1 and 2; evacuation of Saigon—introduction, observations of the defense attaché, observations of the service attachés, special planning group activities, control coordination, communications and execution of sealift and airlift operations, personnel processing, movement of sensitive Vietnamese nationals, Operation TALON VISE/FREQUENT WIND.
- 0607 **Negotiating with the North Vietnamese: A Military Perspective.**  
*Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kans. John T. Thomas. June 1975. 134 pp.*  
 The Four Party Joint Military Team (FPJMT) was established two months after the signing of the Paris agreement in January 1973. The purpose of the FPJMT was to negotiate the implementation of article 8(B) of the agreement which called for repatriation of the remains of the dead and an exchange of information concerning the missing in action. Each of the governments signatory to the Paris agreement was

represented on the team: The U.S., the Republic of Vietnam (RVN), the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam (PRG). After almost a year and a half, the negotiations ended when the DRV and PRG announced their decision to permanently cease their participation at the conference table. This study describes the various activities of the FPJMT and analyzes the negotiations to determine the negotiating tactics and strategy used by the U.S. and DRV negotiators.

- 0741 **Policy Precedents: U.S. Involvement in Vietnam, 1944-1961.**  
*Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kans. Joseph A. Walton. June 1975. 166 pp.*  
The thesis identifies a force, inherent in the national security decisionmaking process, which contributed to the American involvement in Vietnam. Termed policy precedents, this force may be outside the control of the unwary decisionmaker and can result in irrational international behavior on the part of the nation. The study shows that the increasing U.S. involvement in Vietnam from 1941 to 1961 can be explained, at least in part, by the impetus given the decision process by "policy precedents." It clearly shows that American policy evolved from relatively minor incremental but always escalating changes.
- 0908 **The Impact of U.S. Domestic Law on the Last Days of American Presence in Vietnam.**  
*Rand Corp., Santa Monica, Calif. T. Carhart. May 1975. 24 pp.*  
This study examines the military situation in the spring of 1975. It attempts to provide some insight into the limitations placed on the American effort by the War Powers Resolution and Public Law 93-50. It also explores the latitude the President may have had in any proposed support or rescue effort.

## Reel XII

- 0001 **Operation NEW ARRIVALS. Phase I—The Buildup, April 27, 1975 - May 23, 1975. Part I.**  
*Armament Development and Test Center, Eglin AFB, Fla. July 1975. 227 pp.*  
The Eglin Refugee Processing Center at Auxiliary Field 2, Eglin AFB, Florida, came into existence as a direct consequence of the abrupt cessation of the U.S. presence on April 29, 1975 in South Vietnam (Republic of Vietnam-RVN). Before the total collapse of the RVN, the U.S. provided the means for Vietnamese employees of the U.S. government and U.S. contractors and other Vietnamese to exit South Vietnam for the U.S. The establishment of the Eglin Refugee Processing Center as one of the four refugee centers in CONUS is chronicled to depict the planning, construction, operations, administration, and impact of Operation NEW ARRIVALS at Eglin AFB. Events and experiences encountered had both an ephemeral and permanent value. For that reason those events and experiences are discussed, analyzed, and critiqued to provide an overview of judicious interfacing of the integral parts of each function as they affected the whole. This approach was selected because it eliminated untoward functional or organizational competition, thus making it possible to answer in totality and with relevancy what exactly did the air force do. Phase I—The Buildup—covers the period from April 27 to May 23, 1975 and includes selected supporting documents at Tabs A to Tabs K and photographs.
- 0228 **Operation NEW ARRIVALS. Phase II—The Pipeline Phase, May 24 - June 28, 1975. Part II.**  
*Armament Development and Test Center, Eglin AFB, Fla. Aug. 1975. 98 pp.*  
The Eglin Refugee Processing Center at Auxiliary Field 2, Eglin AFB, Florida, entered its operational period—The Pipeline Phase—on May 24, 1975. In the ensuing month, until June 28, 1975, the NEW ARRIVALS Task Force operated to maintain and insure the health and welfare of the Vietnamese refugees who were being processed and awaiting sponsorship. The routine activities of the Pipeline Phase were in sharp contrast with the rapidly occurring events of the Buildup Phase from April 27-May

23. The Buildup Phase was the subject of Part I of this report and the Pipeline Phase is herein described. For the interested reader documents pertinent to Operation NEW ARRIVALS have been made an integral part of the archives of the ADTC Office of History.

0326 **Operation NEW ARRIVALS. Phase III—The Phasedown, June 29-September 19, 1975. Part III.**

*Armament Development and Test Center, Eglin AFB, Fla. Oct. 1975. 251 pp.*

The report on Operations NEW ARRIVALS prepared by the ADTC Office of History mirrors and chronicles an event without precedent for the U.S. and, in particular, the U.S. Air Force. Painstaking efforts were exerted to make this trilogy available to all in the present and future. Furthermore, this report is of especial historical value as one of the sequels to the entire historical coverage of the Southeast Asia experience. This report will serve to answer the inevitable question in the future: "Whatever happened to the refugees from Southeast Asia?" With this in mind, the effort that went into the preparation of this document will stand on its own. The report for Phase I served as the model for the record of policymaking decisions at all levels in the Department of Defense and the executive agencies of the federal government.

0577 **Asia and Pacific: Sen Gan Van Tien Dung Article: Great Spring Victory. Volume I and Volume II.**

*Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Washington, DC. 1976. 135 pp.*

Contents include:

Revolutionary violence; important battlefield; the path to the front; battle position arrangements; attack on the stronghold; racing with the enemy and the weather; smash the counterattack; the turning point in the war; capitalize on victory; new opportunity, new strategic decision; the campaign bearing Uncle Ho's name; battle positions are taking shape; boldness, surprise, sure victory; the last hour of the enemy.

0712 **Vietnam: Mao Versus Clausewitz.**

*Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa. William O. Staudenmaier. May 1976. 143 pp.*

The basic question explored by this research paper is: Did the application of the Clausewitzian military strategy by the U.S. during the Vietnam War to combat a Maoist guerrilla war contribute to the American defeat? The nature of guerrilla warfare is examined using four historical examples. The evolution of modern guerrilla warfare by Mao and Giap is described. The Clausewitzian philosophy of war is examined and its impact on U.S. Army doctrine is developed. Counterinsurgent theory and doctrine is explored and finally the Vietnam War strategy is examined from the perspective of both Generals Giap and Westmoreland. The conclusion is that Clausewitzian doctrine did not contribute to the American defeat but that the misapplication of it did. The concluding observation is that Americans, particularly military men, must study the war to determine its lessons and must not turn their backs on the war or consider it an aberration.

0855 **The U.S.S.R.-DRV-PRC Triangle in Southeast Asia.**

*Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa. Donald E. Weatherbee. Nov. 1976. 29 pp.*

The future international order in Southeast Asia will be heavily influenced by the ambitions and capabilities of the three major Communist actors—the U.S.S.R., DRV, and PRC. To a great extent relations between the ASEAN states and the Communist states will be a function of the interrelationships among the Communist states themselves. The Sino-Soviet conflict defines the orientations of the U.S.S.R. and PRC towards Southeast Asia including Indochina. Both powers accuse the other of seeking hegemony. Both seek influence to the exclusion of the other. Both seek allies, but failing that, at least the neutralization of possible allies of the rival. Whether through collective security schemes or indirect balance-of-power politics, the Sino-Soviet confrontation brings a bipolar conflict into Southeast Asia that is unwelcome to the

indigenous actors, including the Southeast Asian Communist states. The DRV has its own autonomous goals in Southeast Asia. In Indochina its primacy is challenged by the Chinese-Cambodian link and a latent Chinese presence in the Laotian People's Democratic Republic. The tension between the DRV and PRC is only partly a consequence of the close relations developed between the U.S.S.R. and the DRV. The Sino-Soviet competition and the quality of relations between each of the Communist giants and the DRV operate to constrain the DRV in the pursuit of its independent goals in Indochina and beyond.

**0884 Operations NEW LIFE/NEW ARRIVALS. U.S. Army Support to the Indochina Refugee Program, April 1, 1975-June 1, 1976.**

*Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (Army), Washington, DC. Gerald O. Anderson and Robert A. Silano. Jan. 1977. 251 pp.*

This Department of the Army after action report deals with U.S. Army involvement in and support of the Indochinese refugee program. Covering the period from April 1, 1975 to June 1, 1976, it focuses on the role of the army staff in crisis management and other aspects of Operations NEW LIFE and NEW ARRIVALS as well as a brief account of army support of Operation BABYLIFT. Included in the report are sections dealing with the preparation, operation and termination of the refugee reception centers at Orote Point, Guam; Fort Chaffee, Ark.; and Fort Indiantown Gap, Pa. Sections treating the participation of army staff agencies and special areas of concern—resources and environmental concerns, winterization, legal considerations and repatriation, refugee employment and enlistment, and Congressional oversight—also appear. A separate section on lessons learned that includes planning factors, problems, recommendations, and suggested principles for future operations concludes the report. Appendixes containing relevant messages and documents, tables, illustrations and a bibliography, plus a pictorial annex, are attached.

## Reel XIII

**0001 Vietnam and the Soviet Asian Strategy.**

*Army Institute for Advanced Russian and East European Studies, APO New York. F. Charles Parker. June 1977. 52 pp.*

This paper examines the place of the Vietnam war in Soviet Asian strategy. The U.S.S.R.'s policy toward North Vietnam since the mid-1950s is seen as a part of a broad strategy designed to reestablish the Sino-Soviet alliance by creating an American military threat to China. When the U.S. decided to gradually withdraw support from South Vietnam, the Soviets' goal shifted to containment of Chinese influence in Asia.

**0053 A Comparative Policy-Process Approach to Vietnam Intervention.**

*Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kans. Charles R. Scribner. June 1978. 238 pp.*

This thesis provides a comparative policy-process perspective of Vietnam intervention. It is comparative in the sense that the Eisenhower administration's policy process in the 1954 Indochina crisis is used as a basis to compare the Johnson administration's policymaking which led to intervention in 1965. The study's analysis centers on the policy processes of the two administrations and how the differences in their policymaking contributes to the explanation of the opposite decisions on military intervention. The study's conclusion is that the Johnson policy process was comparatively exclusionary and, as a result, not effective in formulating Vietnam policy. In comparison to the more open Eisenhower policymaking, in the Johnson administration dysfunctional policymaking elements are identified in the executive bureaucracy, the role of the President, other policymakers, and Congress. As a result the policy process did not sustain a thorough evaluation of the alternatives and the cost of being an intervenor.



- 0291 **The Fall of South Vietnam: Statements by Vietnamese Military and Civilian Leaders.** *Rand Corp., Santa Monica, Calif. Stephen T. Hosmer, Konrad Kellen, and Brian M. Jenkins. Dec. 1978. 139 pp.*

This report summarizes extensive oral and written statements by 27 former high-ranking South Vietnamese military officers and civilians on their perceptions of the causes of the collapse of South Vietnam in 1975. The causes cited were many and interwoven—shortcomings in South Vietnam's political and military leadership, planning, and organization—but all were tied to what the interviewees saw as the overarching cause for the collapse: the American role in Vietnam. They viewed the withdrawal of American troops, the loss of U.S. manpower, and the reduction of aid after the Paris Agreements as making defeat inevitable. Other factors included irresolution and reversals of strategy by Vietnamese leaders, and failure of commanders to stay with their units in battle. Finally, some of the respondents saw the events as part of the fundamental struggle between East and West, in which communism, in their view, had the advantage. Most seem to agree on one point—that the U.S.-South Vietnamese interaction was largely a failure.

- 0430 **Print Coverage of Military Conflict: The *Los Angeles Times* and the Vietnam War. A Content Analysis, 1964-1972.** *Army Military Personnel Center, Alexandria, Va. Richard Paul Holk. June 1979. 88 pp.*

In a study of the *Los Angeles Times*, 135 issues were content analyzed to determine trends in coverage of the Vietnam War and public opposition to the war over a nine-year period. Seven war-related categories were analyzed: U.S. forces in combat, U.S. military activities other than in Vietnam, war-related activities not involving the U.S., the antiwar movement, defense appropriations, and non-combat activities involving U.S. forces in Vietnam. Of these, the first two received the most coverage, while the antiwar movement and defense appropriations received the least. Statistically significant trends were noted. Stories reporting U.S. forces in Vietnam decreased while antiwar protest stories increased over the research period. A total of 1,506 stories, editorials, art items, and photographs were coded. Of these, 1,348 stories were subjected to analysis ranging from descriptive statistics to Spearman rank-order correlations. This thesis also contains an exhaustive literature review and bibliography of references relating to the Vietnam War, public protests against the war, press coverage of wars in general and the Vietnam War in particular, content analysis of newspapers and other media publications, and the interplay of war coverage and protests.

- 0518 **U.S. Ground Troops in South Vietnam Were in Areas Sprayed with Herbicide Orange.** *General Accounting Office, Federal Personnel and Compensation Div., Washington, DC. Nov. 1979. 23 pp.*

Between 1966 and 1969 a large number of U.S. ground troops in Vietnam were in areas sprayed with herbicide Orange both during and shortly after spraying. DOD took few precautions to prevent exposure because at that time it did not consider the herbicide to be toxic or dangerous to humans. Marines assigned to units in sprayed areas can be identified, but army personnel cannot because army records are incomplete. Troops' actual exposure or the degree of exposure to the herbicide cannot be documented from available records. Also, the long-term effects of exposure remain largely unknown. Congress should direct DOD, VA, HEW, or the Environmental Protection Agency to determine whether a study is needed of the health effects of herbicide Orange on ground troops discussed in this report. GAO issued this report at the request of Senator Charles Percy, ranking minority member of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs.

- 0541 **The U.S.S.R. and Vietnam.**  
*Rand Corp., Santa Monica, Calif. Douglas Pike. May 1980. 17 pp.*  
This memorandum considers the relationship between the U.S.S.R. and Vietnam. The author suggests that the bands of necessity which have held Vietnam to the U.S.S.R. eventually will be loosened and the Vietnamese will seek to distance themselves from Moscow. He foresees no possibility that Vietnam will ever become a satellite of the U.S.S.R., in the manner of East Europe. He concludes that there appears to be a great paradoxical law at work in associating oneself with the Vietnamese: any successful relationship is an eventual catastrophe. Moscow may succeed where others have failed, but more likely it too will become a victim of Vietnam.
- 0558 **The Impact of the Vietnam Conflict on the Economy of the U.S.**  
*Rand Corp., Santa Monica, Calif. Alwyn H. King. July 1980. 24 pp.*  
This paper reviews the key events and government policies during the Korean and Vietnam conflicts, to compare government initiatives to control the adverse economic effects of rapid military buildup and subsequent cutback in military spending in both cases. Lessons to be learned from successes and failures of these two experiences are discussed, and claims that Vietnam military spending has been the root cause of the continuing inflationary spiral in the U.S. are evaluated.
- 0582 **An Analysis of Events Leading to the Chinese Invasion of Vietnam.**  
*Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Calif. Luanne J. Smith. Sept. 1980. 162 pp.*  
This thesis focuses on events in Southeast Asia which contributed to the causes of the Chinese invasion of Vietnam in 1979. It is shown that Vietnam was largely responsible for the Vietnam-Cambodia conflict and for the internal political chaos within Cambodia after 1975; that local hostilities in the Indochinese peninsula were intimately related to worldwide Communist/anti-Communist struggles and to the Sino-Soviet dispute; and that the Chinese invasion of Vietnam was largely in response to the earlier Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia.

# SUBJECT INDEX

*The following index is a guide to the major subjects of the 13 reels. The Roman numeral refers to the reel, and the Arabic number refers to the frame number at which a particular study begins. Hence III:0934 directs the researcher to the study which begins at Frame 0934 of Reel III. By referring to the Reel Index which comprises the initial section of this guide, the researcher can find the main entry for this study.*

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
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